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Abstract
Background—Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) causes severe 
respiratory illness in humans. Fundamental questions about circulating viruses and transmission 
routes remain.
Methods—We assessed routinely collected epidemiologic data for MERS-CoV cases reported in 
Saudi Arabia during 1 January– 30 June 2015 and conducted a more detailed investigation of cases 
reported during February 2015. Available respiratory specimens were obtained for sequencing.
Results—During the study period, 216 MERS-CoV cases were reported. Full genome (n = 17) or 
spike gene sequences (n = 82) were obtained from 99 individuals. Most sequences (72 of 99 
[73%]) formed a discrete, novel recombinant subclade (NRC-2015), which was detected in 6 
regions and became predominant by June 2015. No clinical differences were noted between 
clades. Among 87 cases reported during February 2015, 13 had no recognized risks for secondary 
acquisition; 12 of these 13 also denied camel contact. Most viruses (8 of 9) from these 13 
individuals belonged to NRC-2015.
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Discussions—Our findings document the spread and eventual predominance of NRC-2015 in 
humans in Saudi Arabia during the first half of 2015. Our identification of cases without 
recognized risk factors but with similar virus sequences indicates the need for better understanding 
of risk factors for MERS-CoV transmission.
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Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is known to cause severe 
respiratory illness in humans, with deaths recorded in 35%–40% of cases reported globally 
[1]. Since the first recognition of MERS in 2012, all cases reported to the World Health 
Organization have been linked to the Arabian Peninsula, with >85% of cases reported from 
Saudi Arabia [1]. Camels (Camelus dromedarius) have been suspected as a reservoir for 
MERS-CoV, based on case investigations [2], serologic studies [3], and the isolation of virus 
from camels [4–8]. Direct camel contact has also been identified as a risk factor for human 
illness [9]. Secondary human transmission has been demonstrated among close contacts of 
symptomatic cases, primarily following healthcare-associated exposures [10–12] and, to a 
lesser degree, household exposures [13]. There is no definitive evidence of sustained human-
to-human transmission in the community [14].
MERS-CoV infection can exhibit a wide range of clinical manifestations, including mild or 
limited symptoms among those identified through contact tracing [11]. Prolonged viral 
shedding from the respiratory tract of those without obvious symptoms has been 
demonstrated [15], and transmission related to unrecognized cases has been suggested [12, 
16] but not documented.
MERS-CoV sequences obtained to date suggest periodic introductions of the virus into 
human populations, presumably from an animal reservoir, with subsequent limited chains of 
transmission in households and healthcare settings. The temporal persistence of identified 
viral clades appears limited, consistent with an R0 of <1 [17, 18]. Intervals between the 
beginning and end of the circulation of a clade vary, with longer intervals suggesting the 
existence of undetected human cases [19]. Cases and clusters continue to be reported from 
countries in or near the Arabian Peninsula, presenting an ongoing threat for broader 
transmission [20].
To assess the epidemiologic and clinical features of the disease, we investigated all cases 
reported by the Saudi Arabia Ministry of Health (MoH) during January– June 2015, and we 
attempted genetic sequencing on all available specimens.
Methods
This investigation was part of an emergency public health response and was determined to 
be nonresearch by the MoH and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
therefore not subject to institutional review board review.
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Epidemiologic Investigation
MERS-CoV Case Definition in Saudi Arabia—At the time of this investigation, 
reporting in Saudi Arabia was required for all patients with clinical or radiologic evidence of 
MERS-CoV infection and a positive real-time reverse transcription– polymerase chain 
reaction (rRT-PCR) test result [21]. All rRT-PCR– positive cases identified at non-MoH 
facilities required confirmation at MoH laboratories.
January–June 2015—We assessed the routinely collected epidemiologic information for 
all MERS-CoV cases reported by the MoH during 1 January–30 June 2015, to provide a 
basic epidemiologic description. For this analysis, we included only individuals who met the 
case definition described above (ie, symptomatic cases).
February 2015—February 2015 was a period of increased reporting. To perform a more 
in-depth analysis, we collected additional information for all individuals with laboratory-
confirmed MERS-CoV infections during February 2015. This included all cases meeting the 
case definition as described above, as well as those identified as having a laboratory-
confirmed case but no recognized symptoms; individuals not meeting the case definition 
[21] were typically identified through contact tracing. We reviewed available MoH case 
investigation records and data reported through the MoH Health Electronic Surveillance 
Network. We collected demographic information, medical history, outcome information, and 
treatment location. We assessed the likelihood of acquisition from another person (secondary 
acquisition) by determining whether a patient (1) was a healthcare professional (HCP), (2) 
had been admitted to a healthcare facility 2–14 days before illness onset, (3) had visited any 
healthcare facility in the 14 days before illness onset, or (4) had direct contact with either 
another documented case of MERS-CoV infection or with someone with an acute 
respiratory illness of unknown cause in the 14 days prior to illness. When it was not possible 
to determine the criteria described above by using available information, we conducted 
telephone interviews (in Arabic) to collect additional exposure information. Proxies (a close 
friend or immediate family member who was familiar with the patient's activities during this 
period) were interviewed if the case was deceased, still hospitalized, or too ill to participate. 
Among cases without any of the aforementioned risk factors for secondary acquisition 
(hereafter referred to as sporadic cases), we asked during telephone interviews about the 
history of exposure to camels [9]. Interviewees were prompted to describe examples of 
camel exposures, including direct contact or visiting a live market, slaughterhouse, or race 
where camels were present. We also assessed travel history.
Statistical Analysis—Demographic and clinical characteristics were reported, and 
differences were assessed for significance by using χ2, Wilcoxon rank sum, and Kruskal–
Wallis tests, where appropriate. Data were analyzed using SAS, version 9.3 (SAS Institute, 
Cary, North Carolina).
Molecular Detection and Sequencing
Molecular testing was performed on all respiratory specimens available during January–June 
2015.
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Specimens and Molecular Testing at the MoH—Respiratory specimens, including 
nasopharyngeal and oral pharyngeal swabs, both separate and combined, nasopharyngeal 
and tracheal aspirates, and sputa collected from suspected MERS cases were tested at MOH 
laboratories by upE and ORF1a rRT-PCR assays [22]. Available specimen aliquots (or RNA 
extracts) that tested positive for MERS-CoV by both assays were shipped on dry ice to the 
CDC (Atlanta, Georgia) for sequencing.
Molecular Testing at the CDC—Sample aliquots (200–300 μL, if available) were 
extracted on a NucliSens EasyMAG (BioMerieux), and 100 μL of total nucleic acid elutes 
were recovered. The specimen extract were retested by MERS-CoV N2 and/or N3 rRT-PCR 
assays [23], and sequencing was attempted on confirmed positive samples. Overlapping 
nested primer sets were used for amplification and Sanger sequencing of the MERS-CoV 
spike genes and selected genomes (Supplementary Table 1). Amplicon sequencing was 
performed in both directions, using sequencing and internal amplification primers, with the 
BigDye Terminator v3.1 Cycle Sequencing Kit on a 3730xl Genetic Analyzer (Thermo 
Fisher Scientific). Sequencher 5.3 software (Gene Codes) was used for sequence assembly 
and editing.
Phylogenetic Analyses—Nucleotide sequences were aligned using Clustal X, version 
1.83, implemented in BioEdit, version 7.2.5. Phylogenies were estimated using neighbor-
joining and maximum likelihood methods implemented in Molecular Evolutionary Genetics 
Analysis, version 6.0621 [24], and Bayesian inference, using MrBayes v3.2.6 [25]. The 
neighbor-joining method used maximum composite likelihood distance estimation and 
maximum likelihood used general time reversible (GTR) model of nucleotide substitution 
with γ-distributed rate variation and a proportion of invariant sites (GTR + G + I). MrBayes 
was performed under a GTR model of nucleotide substitution with 4 categories of γ-
distributed rate heterogeneity and a proportion of invariant sites (GTR + 4 + I).
Genetic Recombination and Ancestral Analysis
Putative recombination events were identified using Recombination Detection Program 
software, version 4.70 (RDP4; available at: http://web.cbio.uct.ac.za/∼darren/rdp.html), with 
the default settings [26]. The complete genome sequence of each of the viruses in the 
NRC-2015 clade was aligned with the genomes outside the clade. The multiple sequence 
alignment was then imported into the RDP software for detection of recombination. The 
software uses several algorithms, including GENE-CONV, BootScan, MaxChi, Chimaera, 
SiScan, and 3Seq, to detect putative recombination events. The potential minor and major 
parental sequences and the beginning and end breakpoints of the potential recombinant 
sequences were also defined by RDP4 software. Putative recombinant events were 
considered significant when a P value of ≤ .05 was observed for the same event, using ≥4 
algorithms.
Time estimates to the most recent ancestor were calculated using the Bayesian Markov 
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method implemented in BEAST v1.8.2 [27]. The coding 
regions (ORF1ab, S, ORF3, ORF4a, ORF4b, ORF5, E, M, and N) in the genomes grouping 
within NRC-2015 were concatenated, and the HKY+ Γ4 substitution model was used with 
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independent rates for each of the positions in the codon. A lognormal relaxed molecular 
clock (uncorrelated) was used with Gaussian Markov random field Bayesian skyride 
coalescent. Bayesian MCMC analysis was run for 25 million steps. Parameters for tMRCA, 
rate, and trees were sampled every 5000 steps, with the first 10% removed as burn-in. Time 
estimate values thus obtained were also compared with strict and exponential relaxed clock 
models.
Results
During 1 January–30 June 2015, 216 MERS-CoV cases from 10 of the 13 regions of Saudi 
Arabia were reported by the MoH; MERS-CoV–positive individuals with no recognized 
symptoms, and who therefore did not meet the case definition, were not included. The 
longest period between case reports was 11 days. Among these 216 cases, 214 were 
hospitalized, and 102 (47%) died. Most patients were male (161 [75%]) and of Saudi 
nationality (147 [68%]). Median age was 56 years (range, 20–93 years).
Molecular Analysis of MERS-CoV Strains
Of the 216 symptomatic cases reported during the study period, 124 had respiratory 
specimens available for further testing at the CDC; 1 specimen was also available from an 
individual with no recognized symptoms who did not meet the case definition. Of the 125 
available respiratory specimens collected during 6 January–3 June 2015, spike gene 
sequences were obtained from 99 (Supplementary Table 2). Phylogenetic analysis of the 99 
spike sequences with 251 previously published sequences (Figure 1) revealed a novel 
subclade (henceforth referred to as NRC-2015) within clade B [18]; this subclade contained 
most (72 of 99 [72.7%7]) of the 2015 sequences and included sequences recently reported 
from travel-associated MERS cases in the Republic of Korea (accession number KT029139), 
China (KT006149), and Thailand (KT225476). The neighbor joining tree bootstrap value 
supporting NRC-2015 was low (<70%), which may reflect the recombinant character of the 
clade sequences (see below) or the lower number of informative sites in the spike gene. 
However, similar tree topologies reproducing NRC-2015 were obtained with the spike gene 
sequences by both maximum likelihood and Bayesian analyses, supporting this finding (data 
not shown). To more fully characterize NRC-2015, 17 MERS-CoV–positive samples with 
sufficient available volume were selected for genome sequencing, including 12 NRC-2015 
sequences from different time points and 5 from outside of the subclade.
Phylogenetic analysis of these full genomes with genome sequences available on GenBank 
reproduced NRC-2015 with high support values (Supplementary Figure 1). Mutational 
analysis of the 12 new NRC-2015 genomes with previously published NRC-2015 genomes 
obtained from human samples collected in Saudi Arabia (n = 2), Korea/China (n = 2), and 
Thailand (n = 1) revealed 9 unique nucleotide substitutions common to all NRC-2015 
members, of which 3 were nonsynonymous, with predicted amino acid changes in the 
ORF1a (n = 2) and matrix (n = 1) proteins (Supplementary Table 3). Recombination analysis 
on the newly available genome sequences from NRC-2015 identified 2 possible 
recombination events involving sequences from outside the clade as potential minor and 
major parental strains. The first event had a predicted breakpoint at nucleotide position 17 
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475 (99% confidence interval [CI], 13 502–19 074), located in ORF1ab, and the second 
event had a predicted breakpoint at 23 976 (99% CI, 23 571– 24 862), located in the spike 
gene. Recombination analysis was performed using RDP software, and events detected with 
a P value of ≤ .05 were considered evidence of true recombination (Supplementary Table 4).
To date the emergence of NRC-2015, MCMC analysis was performed on the concatenated 
coding regions of the genomes grouping within NRC-2015, using BEAST. The most recent 
common ancestor of the virus was approximately 0.85 years (95% CI, .45–1.34) before 
sample KT225476.2 (17 June 2015), or August 2014 (Supplementary Table 5).
Epidemiologic Investigation
Among the 216 cases reported during 1 January–30 June 2015, NRC-2015 was first detected 
in a case with onset in mid-January 2015 (Figure 2A). During the study period, NRC-2015 
viruses were detected in 6 regions of Saudi Arabia (Figure 3), and the proportion of patients 
identified with NRC-2015 increased steadily over time (Figure 2B).
NRC-2015 was next compared to past and present subclades within clade B, using 
sequences available in GenBank (Figure 4). NRC-2015 was more widely distributed 
geographically than any other identified members of clade B. The duration of circulation of 
recognized subclades ranged from 16 to 665 days. At the conclusion of our investigation 
period, NRC-2015 had been circulating for 135 days, which was longer than 7 of 9 other 
identified subclades. In our analysis, the longest circulating subclade reported was 
Riyadh_KKUH-1_2014, which was first detected in July 2013 and was still circulating as of 
May 2015. During our investigation period, 10 of 99 sequenced viruses belonged to 
Riyadh_KKUH-1_2014. No viruses belonging to clade A were detected.
A comparison of patients infected with NRC-2015 versus other circulating viruses revealed 
no significant differences in age, sex, rate of mortality, time between onset of symptoms and 
death, or length of hospital stay among fatal cases (Supplementary Table 6). There was also 
no difference in mean cycle threshold values, a proxy for virus load, with respiratory 
specimens containing NRC-2015 versus other clades, although these were not adjusted for 
timing of specimen collection (Supplementary Table 6).
For our more detailed analysis of cases reported during 1–28 February 2015, we identified 
87 MERS-CoV–positive patients (Table 1). Of these, 77 patients (89%) satisfied the case 
definition for routine reporting and required hospitalization; the remaining 10 individuals 
(11%) had no recognized symptoms (and did not satisfy the case definition) but are included 
in this analysis. The 87 patients were reported from 35 different healthcare facilities across 7 
regions in Saudi Arabia; 17 of these facilities reported ≥2 cases within the same 14-day 
period. Of these 87 patients, sequences could be obtained from 34, of which 24 (71%) were 
associated with NRC-2015. No clinical differences were apparent when comparing 
NRC-2015 to other circulating viruses (Table 1).
The 87 patients with laboratory-confirmed disease reported during February were also 
classified according to their reported exposures during the 2 weeks before illness onset. 
Record review and interviews were conducted during 11–25 March 2015. Among the 87 
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cases, 51 were classifiable using information obtained by the initial case investigation. 
Interviews were attempted for the remaining 36 patients. Of these, 28 (78%) were 
interviewed; 1 individual refused to participate, and 7 patients were not available. Proxy 
interviews were conducted for 22 of 28 interviews, including for 18 patients who were 
deceased and for 4 of 10 patients who survived.
Among the 87 patients, 13 (15%) were determined to have had household contact with a 
confirmed MERS-CoV case, 14 (16%) were HCPs, 21 (24%) were inpatients in a healthcare 
facility, 16 (18%) were hospital visitors, and 10 (11%) were unable to be classified owing to 
a lack of available information (Table 1). Notably, 13 patients (15%) denied exposure to a 
healthcare facility or to a person with acute respiratory illness in the 2 weeks before illness 
onset and were classified as sporadic cases (Tables 1 and 2); among these, 1 individual 
reported visiting a camel farm in the 2 weeks before illness onset. Among the 13 sporadic 
cases, 2 were available for interview, and 11 were interviewed by proxy. Among the 11 
interviewed by proxy, 9 were deceased and 2 were too ill to participate in the interview. 
Sequences were obtained for 9 sporadic cases, and 8 (89%) were NRC-2015, including the 
individual who had visited the camel farm.
Discussion
Our study provides the first nationwide epidemiologic and phylogenetic description of 
MERS-CoV in humans in Saudi Arabia, allowing for a better understanding of transmission 
during a period of continuous, frequent reporting of new cases. Our investigation 
demonstrates the emergence, persistent circulation, and eventual predominance of a recently 
identified recombinant MERS-CoV clade in humans that includes viruses detected in the 
Republic of Korea [31, 32], Thailand (accession number KT225476), and China in 2015 [31, 
33]. Previous documentation of the duration of circulation in humans of 4 different MERS-
CoV clades in Saudi Arabia during 2012–2013 noted an average detection time of 98 days 
[19]. In contrast, we demonstrate that NRC-2015 has persisted longer than most previously 
documented clades. NRC-2015 was found to eventually predominate over the 6-month study 
period and attain a wide geographic distribution in a comparatively short period. While this 
apparent emergence and clade displacement is suggestive of greater epidemiologic fitness 
[34], we observed no clinical differences between NRC-2015 and other clades; the 
implications for virus replication and transmission need further study. During preparation of 
this manuscript, sequences obtained from camels in Oman in May 2015 [35] and Saudi 
Arabia during July 2014–April 2015 [36] were reported that showed similar recombination 
features and phylogenetic association with NRC-2015. In camels, NRC-2015 (referred to as 
lineage 5 [36]) was first detected in July 2014 and became predominant in Saudi Arabia 
during a period that overlaps with our study, corroborating our findings of an increased 
prevalence in humans relative to other clades.
Recombination has been documented among CoVs [37] and has been linked to the 
emergence of more-pathogenic strains of some animal CoVs [38–40]. Evidence of 
intraspecies recombination has also been found with the human CoVs HKU1 [41], NL63 
[42],OC43 [43], and, more recently, MERS-CoV [44].Genome analysis of human MERS-
CoV strains from Saudi Arabia in 2015 and the recent outbreak in South Korea/China [31–
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33] and camels as noted above [35,36] revealed a probable signature recombination event 
between 2 different parental clade B viruses involving a region of the ORF1ab and spike 
genes. We confirmed this finding and documented an increasing prevalence of this virus in 
humans among samples collected since January 2015 from geographically distant 
communities in Saudi Arabia. Similar to recent reports [33], we estimate that this 
recombinant virus emerged sometime in mid-to-late 2014. Based on recently available 
sequence data from camels in Saudi Arabia, NRC-2015 (lineage 5) was predicted to have 
diverged between December 2013 and June 2014 [36].
In our study, further analysis of 87 patients with laboratory-confirmed MERS-CoV reported 
in February revealed 13 individuals with no recognized risks for secondary acquisition; none 
of these 13 reported direct camel contact, although 1 individual reported visiting a camel 
farm. Of those sequenced, most were infected with genetically very similar viruses, 
suggesting a potential for limited transmission from those with unrecognized MERS-CoV 
infection. These findings highlight the importance of strengthened epidemiologic and 
laboratory surveillance.
Most cases identified in Saudi Arabia in February had documented exposure to healthcare 
facilities, a well-demonstrated risk factor for MERS-CoV infection [10–12]. Seventeen of 35 
affected facilities in Saudi Arabia in February experienced MERS-CoV infection clusters. 
Moreover, 16 of 87 patients in February (18%) were visitors to healthcare facilities. This is 
similar to the 2014 Jeddah outbreak, where 17% of investigated cases were visitors [11]. 
Recommendations to limit visitation in facilities with ongoing MERS-CoV transmission 
should be reinforced to limit these exposures.
Our investigation, which was performed as part of an emergency public health response, is 
subject to several limitations. First, specimens were not available for all cases during the 
study period, meaning that many viruses remained untyped; however, we observed no 
demographic differences between cases who had specimens sequenced and those who did 
not. Second, since its emergence in 2012, surveillance and sequencing of MERS-CoV 
strains has been incomplete; variations in sequence availability and documentation might 
have influenced the extent of persistence and geographic spread that we have determined for 
past circulating virus strains. Case definitions, testing practices, and testing locations have 
also changed during this period. Third, although we were able to obtain full genome 
sequences from 12 NRC-2015 samples, all of which possessed the expected recombinant 
signal, our sequencing was mostly limited to the spike gene alone, which poses the risk of 
misclassifying recombinant viruses as belonging to NRC-2015. This is illustrated in the 
recent study by Sabir et al [36], which reported multiple novel recombinant viruses in 
camels, including recombinants between NRC-2015 (lineage 5) and other virus clades. 
Fourth, because of the high morbidity and mortality of MERS-CoV infection, interviews 
with cases were not always possible, necessitating the use of proxies. It is possible that, 
combined with issues of recall, the quality of the information collected varied. Of particular 
consideration, 11 of 13 sporadic cases were classified on the basis of interviews with 
proxies, and pre-illness exposures might not have been accurately recognized and reported. 
Fifth, some camel exposures may have gone unrecognized because of disincentives for 
reporting camel exposures, given their cultural and economic significance in Saudi Arabia. 
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Sixth, given the existing evidence of association between MERS-CoV illness and pre-illness 
healthcare exposure or exposure to sick individuals [10, 11, 13], our risk classification was 
hierarchical; that is, reported exposure to a setting where secondary acquisition was likely 
took precedence over reported exposure to camels. As such, we did not assess camel 
exposures in individuals with recognized risks for secondary acquisition.
Finally, although we have attempted to link the results of our epidemiologic investigation 
with MERS-CoV sequences obtained from investigated cases, we cannot fully assess the 
possible role of virus introductions from nonhuman sources. Recent phylogeny of MERS-
CoV sequences from camels in Saudi Arabia indicated that the novel recombinant subclade 
(referred to as NRC-2015 in our manuscript) was also predominant in camels during a 
period overlapping with our study [36]. As such, our detection of closely related viruses in 
humans might in part reflect multiple introductions from camels with similar strains. Virus 
introductions from other currently unidentified sources might also be factor. Virus 
transmission dynamics within and between human and nonhuman sources of MERS-CoV 
will likely influence transmission routes in ways not yet fully understood.
This investigation describes the emergence, persistence, and widespread circulation of a 
novel recombinant MERS-CoV in Saudi Arabia. A lack of clearly defined epidemiologic 
links in some cases highlights the need for ongoing intensive epidemiologic and laboratory 
surveillance to better understand MERS-CoV transmission and to focus infection prevention 
and control efforts.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. 
Phylogeny of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) spike sequences. 
Phylogenetic analysis of the MERS-CoV spike gene coding region (4062 nucleotides) 
obtained from 99 cases in this study and 251 previously published sequences available in 
GenBank. Major clades A and B are indicated by vertical bars. The novel subclade 
(NRC-2015) is repositioned for clarity. Spike gene sequences obtained in this study are 
marked with solid circles; red circles indicate samples with available genome sequences 
(Supplementary Figure 1). The tree was constructed by the neighbor-joining method, and 
bootstrap resampling values (1000 replicates) ≥70% are indicated above the respective 
nodes. Numbers in brackets following some strain identifiers are the number of identical 
sequences with the same location and sample collection time. The scale bar shows the 
genetic distance as nucleotide substitutions per site. To compare persistence and geographic 
distribution of NRC-2015 with other viruses identified during 2012–2015, we assigned virus 
sequences to different subclades (depicted in color), based on previously described clades 
[19, 28–30].
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Figure 2. 
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) cases reported by the Saudi 
Arabia Ministry of Health (MoH) during 1 January–30 June 2015. A, MERS-CoV cases, by 
clade and week of illness onset. B, Sequenced viruses, by clade and month of illness onset. 
The 216 cases reported by the MoH during 1 January–30 June 2015 are included. These 
graphs do not include the single sequence from the individual with no recognized symptoms 
who did not meet the case definition. NRC-2015 was defined using the spike gene 
phylogenies (Figure 1).
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Figure 3. 
Map of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) cases, by subclade and 
region of Saudi Arabia. The 216 cases reported by the Saudi Arabia Ministry of Health 
during 1 January–30 June 2015, are included. This map does not include the single sequence 
from the individual with no recognized symptoms who did not meet the case definition. 
NRC-2015 was defined using the spike gene phylogenies (Figure 1).
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Figure 4. 
Geotemporal distribution of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) 
clades in Saudi Arabia during 1 January 2013–30 June 2015. For human-derived sequences 
in each subclade within the broader clade B (as defined using the spike gene phylogenetic 
analysis in Figure 1), we used GenBank to determine length of persistence, using the earliest 
and most recent date of detection (A), and we determined geographic distribution, based on 
city of detection within Saudi Arabia (B). a2015 depicts clades detected through 30 June 
2015.
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Table 1
Epidemiologic and Clinical Characteristics of Patients Identified With Laboratory-
Confirmed Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Infection in February 2015 
in Saudi Arabia
Characteristic
Sequenced
No Sequence, No. (%) (n = 53) Total, No. (%) (n = 87)
NRC-2015 Clade, No. (%) 
(n = 24)
Other Clades, No. (%) (n 
= 10)
Sex
 Male 17 (71) 6 (60) 39 (74) 62 (71)
 Female 7 (29) 4 (40) 14 (26) 25 (29)
Age group, y
 18–34 2 (8) 1 (10) 13 (25) 16 (18)
 35–64 14 (58) 9 (90) 24 (45) 47 (54)
 ≥65 8 (33) 0 (0) 15 (28) 23 (26)
 Unknown 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (2) 1 (1)
Nationality
 Saudi 14 (58) 6 (60) 36 (68) 56 (64)
 Non-Saudi 10 (42) 4 (40) 17 (32) 31 (36)
Underlying illness
 Any 14 (58) 7 (70) 30 (57) 51 (59)
 Diabetes 10 (42) 4 (40) 16 (30) 30 (34)
 Heart disease 1 (4) 1 (10) 3 (6) 5 (6)
 Hypertension 10 (42) 1 (10) 16 (30) 27 (31)
Exposure classification
 Household 1 (4) 2 (20) 10 (19) 13 (15)
 Healthcare provider 4 (17) 1 (10) 9 (17) 14 (16)
 Inpatient 3 (13) 3 (30) 15 (28) 21 (24)
 Hospital visitor 6 (25) 2 (20) 8 (15) 16 (18)
 Sporadica 8 (33) 1 (10) 4 (8) 13 (15)
 Undeterminedb 2 (8) 1 (10) 7 (13) 10 (11)
Hospitalized
 No 0 (0) 0 (0) 10 (19) 10 (11)
 Yes, survived 10 (42) 4 (40) 22 (42) 36 (41)
 Yes, died 14 (58) 6 (60) 21 (40) 41 (47)
a
Patients who were not a contact of a case or a person with acute respiratory illness and did not report exposure to a healthcare facility in the 2 
weeks prior to illness onset.
b
Patients for whom sufficient data were not available.
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